[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: Re-authentication proposal for LedgerSMB 1.3 (HTTP Auth)
- Subject: Re: Re-authentication proposal for LedgerSMB 1.3 (HTTP Auth)
- From: Ashley J Gittins <..hidden..>
- Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 06:27:11 +1000
As I understand it (and I am pretty likely to get this wrong so feel free to
point that out) the only reason we have to send the user/pass on every http
request is because of the change to using postgresql to authenticate every
request (ie, server-side, LSMB logs into psql as the actual user), therefore
requiring the password to do so.
I remember trying to make the point some time ago that maybe LSMB should
connect as it's own user, then use postgres' role-switching abilities to
become the connected user after connection. As I understand it this can be
done without having to supply the user's password.
Then, you have the advantage of not needing the plaintext password for every
request (since LSMB can track a list of valid sessions and logs into psql
as "itself"), and we can still use per-role access restrictions on tables etc
in psql, since lsmb will switch roles to that user to perform data
operations.
As for Chris' point about the initial login being just as dangerous as the
on-going requests I think it's a good one.
Additionally, I think using http-auth would be a step backwards, given that
some browsers are pretty unpredictable with the credentials (tell me a way to
make a browser reliably "forget" credentials? afaik, there isn't one), so
shared computers are more vulnerable to left-over logins using http-auth than
those based on sessions.
--
Regards,
Ashley J Gittins
web: http://www.purple.dropbear.id.au
jabber: ..hidden..